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1.  Research Aim, Questions and Methodology
Irrigation development contributes most effectively to poverty alleviation if rights to the newly
developed water resources and irrigated land are vested in the poor (Chambers et al. 1989). In
this way, benefits of irrigation investments accrue primarily to the poor. If irrigation infrastructure
is developed on sites of small and large landowner farmers, the largest part of the benefits of
water is for the larger landowner farmers, because division of benefits more or less follows
inequities in land distribution. The landless poor are altogether excluded from direct gains, although
increased wage employment opportunities and higher food availability may improve their well-
being indirectly. Thus, irrigation development risks being biased towards those who already own
land.
The acknowledgement of this fact has stimulated irrigation investors to uphold poverty
alleviation as their primary aim and to develop irrigation in such a way that it redresses inequities
in resource rights. For example, targeting the poor was achieved by prioritizing infrastructure
development in sites owned by poor people (PATA 1996). In some countries such as Tunisia, Kenya,
and Sri Lanka another major way of reaching the poor was effected through the implementation
of a distributive land reform in the command area (Jazairy et al. 1992). In smaller schemes also
irrigation development was accompanied by a distributive land reform, as done in Peru (Martinez
1998).
Another option to ensure less unequal benefits for the poor is by allocating water rights equally
among all landowners, tenants and landless people. In these cases, water is not only used to irrigate
own plots but also for exchange and sale, which opens up new possibilities for those with little
or no land. This allocation principle of “water to the people” is claimed to be more pro-poor than
the common principle of “water to the land” by which water is allocated to landowners in the
command area, proportional to their land size. In South Asia, the principle of “water to the people”
has been implemented, for example, in tank irrigation in Sukhomajri, Haryana (Sarin 1996), in
tubewell irrigation in the Pani Panchayat projects in Maharashtra (Chambers et al. 1989), and
through Landless Irrigation Groups in Bangladesh (van Koppen and Mahmud 1996). However,
especially in canal irrigation, there is little or no empirical evidence to show whether this option
of allocating equal water rights does actually benefit the poor.
The present research aims to fill this latter gap by analyzing the experiences in the Andhi
Khola Irrigation Scheme in the hills of west central Nepal. The United Mission to Nepal (UMN),
in collaboration with the Department of Irrigation of His Majesty’s Government of Nepal, initiated
this project in 1982. An area of 282 hectares of which only small portions received water from
seasonal streams came under year-round irrigation. A distributive land reform policy was
implemented in this area according to which larger farmers had to sell part of their land for resale
to the landless. Moreover, the project designed and implemented a water allocation system in which
everyone could earn tradable water rights (shares) through participation in construction work. In
1997, the scheme was finalized and handed over to the Andhi Khola Water Users Association
(AKWUA).
The research focused on the following questions:
• How was the land redistribution designed and implemented, and what are the effects for
different categories of farmers and landless people?
• How was the allocation of equal water rights designed and implemented, and what are
the effects for the different categories of farmers and landless people?2
• What are the overall benefits of the Andhi Khola Irrigation Project for poor farmers?
• What lessons and recommendations for successful targeting of irrigation investments at
the poor are to be retained for replication elsewhere?
Answers to these questions were sought through open interviews among male and female water
users, irrigation leaders, project staff, and other informants; observation of major events; and review
of literature and project documents. This allowed an ex-post reconstruction of the project design
and implementation. For the impact assessment, structured interviews were held. Respondents to
the questionnaires were purposely selected from different social strata to include both men and
women from the poorest strata as well. The household poverty status was defined according to
land-holding size of irrigated and rain-fed land, per capita agricultural production, and off-farm
incomes. Four socioeconomic categories were distinguished—poorest, poor, middle and better off.
In total, 35 men and 48 women in 53 households were interviewed. Ten households were female-
headed households. 
The 53 sample households were spread over different socioeconomic groups as follows:
• 4 Households: Better-off: 0.8–1.25 hectares of irrigated land per household, food surplus,
often with off-farm employment.
• 19 Households: Middle: 0.35–0.8 hectare of irrigated land per household, food self-
sufficient, some have off-farm employment.
• 7 Households: Poor: 0.15-0.35 hectare of irrigated land per household, food deficiency
for less than 6 months per year, limited wage work.
• 23 Households: Poorest: less than 0.15 hectare of irrigated land per household, most of
them are wage workers.
2.  Background and General Benefits from the Andhi Khola Irrigation Project
2.1  Poverty characteristics of the project area
The project area, a low ridge located between the Andhi Khola river in the north and the Kali
Gandaki river in the south in the southern part of the Syangja district, is poverty-stricken.
Population density is as high as 370 persons per square kilometer. The total population consists
of approximately 15,000 people, of which 75 percent are Hindus (Westborg 1989). Eighty-two
percent of the households own less than half a hectare of land (Poppe 1983). The cultivation of
the arable land is intense but risk-prone because of unsteady soils and landslides. Few farmers
have access to irrigated land; their plots are less than 0.5 hectares. Only less than 3 percent own
more than 1.5 hectares of irrigated land. About 70 percent of the households cannot reach food
self-sufficiency in this area (NSAE 1997:3). Most families try to increase their income by taking
up temporary jobs in or outside the area. Consequently, half the men between 20 and 40 years
are away from their families in search of additional income for their families (Poppe 1983). The
most important income-generating sectors are agriculture, construction work, the army, and some
business activities.3
Maize, pulses and millet are the main food crops on the rain-fed land on the upper slopes of
the hills. Grass for fodder is grown on the steeper slopes. Before the Andhi Khola irrigation project
was launched, some fields in the flat areas near the rivers were irrigated all year round (Poppe
1983). Other fields only received canal water supplied by flows during the summer (monsoon).
If there was sufficient water, three crops per year were grown: rice, wheat and maize. After the
implementation of the irrigation project, this became the most predominant cropping pattern
throughout the command area.
2.2  Scheme layout
The Andhi Khola river, which is the main water source for the Andhi Khola Irrigation Scheme, is
fed by melted water and rain. The discharge of the Andhi Khola river measured at the headwork
of the irrigation system strongly varies: from 1.8 to 362.2 cubic meters per second (NSAE1997:
6). Water is scarcest in the spring months from February to April. The headwork is located at
Tallo Galyang Bazar of Jagatradevi Village Development Committee. From the Andhi Khola river,
water is diverted to the surge tank of a power plant of the Butwal Power Company (BPC) and to
the irrigation system. The power plant requires a discharge of 2,700 liters per second to generate
power on full capacity. For irrigation, discharges of 0-600 liters per second are required depending
on the crop, the crop stage, and on additional rains.
The altitude of the command area ranges from 380-625 meters above sea level (NSAE 1997: 4).
Seventy-three percent of the irrigated lands are flatter than 8 degrees, but other parts include sloping
lands up to 30 degrees. Immediately downstream of the head-intake, the canal splits into the eastern
and western main canal. The eastern main canal is a contour canal of 5.1 km and has eight
secondary off-takes (E1-E8). The eastern main canal is lined with soil cement and its capacity is
of 642 liters per second at the head and of 17 liters per second at the tail. The alignment of this
main canal passes through numerous drainage crossings that have been provided with pipe siphons.
Figure 1. Siphoning of water from the main irrigation scheme to the Asardi sub-scheme
in the Andhi Khola Irrigation Scheme.
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By doing so, the steep slopes remain stable. The eastern main canal serves 180 hectares of land.
The eastern canal also supplies the Asardi Pipe Canal System (2.42 km long), to feed the slopes
on the other side of the valley. The outlet of the pipe is built at the highest point of the Asardi
village, from where four tertiary canals irrigate another 85 hectares of land.
The western main canal is 1.5 km long. It supplies 17 hectares of land through two branches.
The capacity of this canal is 45 liters per second at the head end and 14 liters per second at the
tail end. Up to the first crossing the main canal is a buried pipe, after that it continues as a contour
canal. There are two earthen unlined branch canals, W1 and W2.
The tertiary system consists of earthen canals running down the slopes. Designed discharges
vary from 15-10 liters per second, and areas served vary from 6-44 hectares. Necessary drop
structures and flumes with stilling basins are constructed to dissipate excess energy and prevent
erosion. Distribution boxes in the branches make it possible to distribute water proportionally,
even if it concerns only small quantities (NSAE, 1997:11).
Because of the one kilometer hard rock tunnel, the siphon to the Asardi sub-scheme, and other
devices, the scheme is relatively expensive.
2.3  General Benefits from the Andhi Khola Irrigation Scheme
Before implementation of the project in the selected sites, natural springs irrigated 57 hectares.
The new scheme that covers this area also includes formerly rain-fed and fallow land, totaling
282 hectares. The land distribution in the formerly rain-fed and fallow land was less skewed than
in the irrigated part, so the new Andhi Khola Irrigation Scheme includes relatively more small
landowners than in the formerly spring-irrigated area.
As reported by the respondents, farm households that gained access to irrigation through the
project benefited considerably. Households in the command area increased production from two
to three crops per year and achieved higher yields, which improved their food security and income.
Figure 2. Overview of Andhi Khola irrigation project area.
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The number of livestock grew because of the increasing wealth in the area and the need for more
compost on the intensively cultivated fields in the irrigation system. Larger landowners who lacked
labor for this type of cropping intensification started to lease out more land, to the benefit of
land-poor farmers. Cropping intensification has also increased employment opportunities for paid
laborers.
However, the burdens of these benefits were gender-biased. Women’s tasks in the family farm
increased more than men’s because tasks traditionally handled by women such as weeding,
transplanting and harvesting increased when rain-fed agriculture was replaced by irrigation.
Furthermore, the growing number of livestock required more labor to collect fodder, a task that
was usually done by women.
The water provided by the Andhi Khola Irrigation System is not only used for irrigation. All
families interviewed used the canal water for washing, bathing and cleaning also, while a large
majority (89%), uses it for watering livestock. Three households have a brick factory and one
household has a mill for which canal water is an important resource.
The above-mentioned benefits are typical for most irrigation projects in command areas, where
poor households occupy at least some of the land. However, non-poor households benefit relatively
much more. The following sections will discuss the question as to how the project’s specific
policies of pro-poor land redistribution and allocation of “equal water rights to all” were initiated,
designed and implemented, and whether this further enhanced benefits for the poor.
3.  The Initial Phases of the Andhi Khola Irrigation Project
3.1  The Initiative
The first demand for irrigation development in the Andhi Khola dates back to 1958. Driven by
poverty, the local leaders requested irrigation facilities to intensify agriculture on 1,000 hectares
of land. The request was made to the late King Mahendra during his visit of the Western Region
(Pokhara) in 1958, and reiterated to King Birendra when he visited Pokhara in 1976. In the early
1960s, the Government of Nepal requested the UMN to develop a technical training institute in
Butwal. The Butwal Technical Institute (BTI) and the Butwal industries were started as a training
program for the 14–18 year olds. The first hydro project was a 1 MW scheme close to Butwal
and the electricity from this supported the development of the institute, the industries and the
town. Around 1980, once the BTI was fully operational the UMN initiated a hydropower production
project in Andhi Khola. However, the UMN wanted this to become a developmental project. Thus,
the project combined hydropower production and rural electrification with non-formal education
aimed at women in the area. It also included water supply and sanitation, agricultural extension and
an irrigation project. In addition there was also a savings program for everyone working on the hydro
project. One of the objectives was to reduce poor people’s indebtedness to the moneylenders.
 The Andhi Khola Integrated Rural Development Project was thus initiated. The initial focus
was on hydropower development and a rural electrification program, accompanied by other
activities, including irrigation, drinking water and sanitation, agricultural extension, enterprise
development, and non-formal education. All these efforts would serve as a catalyst for the general
development in the area. In 1982, His Majesty’s Government of Nepal and the UMN signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of a 5 MW power plant and a rural
electrification pilot program. The construction of the hydropower plant was funded by the6
Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation (NORAD). The UMN complemented this with
the integrated rural development program.
3.2  The Design of the Allocation of Land and Water Rights
Acting upon the request of the local leaders, the UMN realized that a mainstream irrigation
development approach would first and foremost benefit landowners, while those who had
smallholdings or who had no land at all would benefit less. The UMN, however, strived for an
irrigation development by which all, landowners and the landless, would benefit equally. Therefore,
in December 1982, the UMN held a meeting with 300 community members to explain its conditions
and negotiate the possibilities of a more equitable irrigation development. The participants
supported the UMN project principles of equitable benefits for both the landed and landless
members of the community. During this meeting, the People’s Irrigation Committee, which later
was transformed into the Andhi Khola Multi-purpose Water Users Association (AKWUA), was
also formed. This committee was responsible for working out the project methodology (Thiessen
1983:17).
During 1982-1984, prior to the construction of the Andhi Khola project a “Motivational
Campaign” was undertaken. A great deal of time was spent on discussing the principle of equitable
benefits with community leaders and government officials (but less with poor beneficiaries
themselves). As an example, the farmer-managed irrigation system in Chherlung in the neighboring
Palpa district was discussed during these meetings. In this system all community members could
obtain equal benefits from their labor contributions in construction and maintenance of the system.
In addition, some study tours were organized for farmer leaders to other irrigation systems such
as Chherlung, Chhattis Mauja in Rupandehi district and the Sukhomajri project in India.
Eventually, the UMN left the options to the local leaders: either the rights to the land or the
rights to the newly developed water should be divided equally among the inhabitants of the Andhi
Khola area. Farmers present were not in favor of a complete land reform and rather preferred to
divide the water equally. The principle, which UMN and the farmers agreed upon was, first, that
the water rights would be divided among the beneficiaries living in the area, based on the labor
contributions during the construction of the scheme and not on the amount of land one owned.
Water would be allocated to all who would earn or purchase shares. This kind of water allocation
would provide financial incentives for efficient water management and expansion of the area served
(Thiessen 1983:13). Second, the resource base of landless and land-poor people, who had earned
access to water, would be ameliorated by giving them access to land. In order to do so, all
households that had more land than strictly needed for subsistence would be obliged to sell 10
percent of their surplus land. These lands were then to be resold to landless and land-poor people
(Thiessen 1983:13). The land redistribution was justified by the fact that 78 percent of the lower
caste people (artisans) do not own irrigated land at all, while only 9 percent of the high castes do
not have irrigated land (Poppe 1983:18).
These resource allocation principles were consolidated and submitted in a Feasibility Study
in 1983. Other important conditions at the outset of the project included a higher participation of
the community in construction, full understanding and support for the principle of equitable
distribution of benefits by the community, and low maintenance costs of the system. The Feasibility
Study also investigated the technical and economic feasibility of the Andhi Kola Irrigation Project.
About 600 hectares of severely water-deficient lands were marked for irrigation, covering the area
of eight Village Development Committees. This would require a workload equaling 80,000 water
shares. The overall benefit-cost ratio of the project exceeded three.7
3.3  AKWUA
The Andhi Khola Multi-Purpose Water Users Association (AKWUA) was set up to provide a
coordinating function between the UMN and the users (UMN 1997:10). It was registered at the
office of the Chief District Officer in Syanja in December 1984 under act 2034. In doing so, it
became the first registered local Water Users Association in Nepal.
AKWUA would co-implement the project and manage the funds. The following responsibilities
were defined:
• Be the direct partner of the UMN during design and construction of the scheme.
• Organize local participation through group meetings and awareness raising.
• Be responsible for the household survey, mobilization of labor, and mobilization of local
building materials.
• Organize the land reallocation by purchasing “surplus” land and resale of the land to the
poor with water shares.
• Distribute the “tickets” (preliminary water share receipts).
• Keep records and take charge of administration.
• Take over the ownership, operation and maintenance of the irrigation scheme after its
construction.
An organizational structure was adopted, whereby the General Assembly was the highest
decision-making body. A Board of Directors was responsible for daily governance. A General
Manager (GM) was responsible for day-to-day management of the irrigation system; he reported
to the Board of Directors. Two advisory bodies were established: the Evaluation Committee (to
evaluate applications for land and advise the Board) and the Land Distribution Committee (to
redistribute land). Shareholders were organized into Branch Committees to manage the concerned
branch. Maintenance and fee collection were part of their tasks.
Initially, membership of the AKWUA was not restricted: everybody registered as resident
(living in the area for at least three months a year) in the project area which covered eight Village
Development Committees (VDC) and who paid an entrance fee of NRs11 could become a member.
In 1989, ownership of shares was added as a condition for membership.
According to AKWUA’s constitution, each member had the right to:
• Earn up to four shares per household member, either through provision of labor, or through
direct payment, during the construction phase of the scheme. In 1989, this was amended
to enable farmers who were willing to contribute more labor to earn more shares. The
maximum number of shares a person could obtain was increased from four to ten.
1NRs 25 equaled US$1 in 1988.8
• Dispose a part of the water flowing out of the head gate at any given time, provided one
had registered the required shares before each season and paid the water fee. The amount
of receivable flow depends on the number of shares a person has registered.
• Lease out shares to other people. This should be done before the start of the new cropping
season.
• Dispose shares to any person who is not forbidden to purchase shares in AKWUA.
• Vote at General Meetings.
• Have priority over non-members in receiving offers of any paid labor for extension or
maintenance of the irrigation system.
Each member was obliged to:
• Offer a sale of 10 percent of “surplus” land to AKWUA.
• Contribute labor for construction of the scheme to earn water shares.
• Pay water fees and contribute to maintenance.
• Respond without fail to the General Manager’s call for labor in case of an emergency.
AKWUA also signed an agreement with the Butwal Power Company (BPC) in 1987, to share
diverted water for their respective use. Under normal circumstances, AKWUA could obtain a
maximum of 687 liters per second of water at the headwork. However, when there was insufficient
water for both the irrigation system and the power plant, priority was given to the power plant.
Nevertheless, there is a provision in the agreement to release water during one week in the dry
season to make maize cultivation possible.
3.4   Household Survey, Adaptation of the Technical Design, and Construction
In 1984–1985, the household survey was implemented in the eight Village Development
Committees of the project area. In this survey, land size was measured in relation to family size
to determine first, which families had to sell how much “surplus” land, second, which families
would be eligible for land allocation, and, third, how many inhabitants of the project area would
be allocated a ticket to earn water shares.
The technical design underwent considerable changes before construction started in 1989. In
1988, a new Memorandum of Understanding was signed between His Majesty’s Government of
Nepal and the UMN. By then, the command area was reduced to 400 hectares. In a new feasibility
and geo-technical assessment study in 1989, the command area was further reduced to 282 hectares,
covering three Village Development Committees: Tulsi Bhanjyang and Jagtradevi in Syangja
district and Hungi in Palpa district. The unstable soil condition made most of the planned stretch
of the western canal unfeasible (Westborg 1989). In this study the benefit-cost ratio dropped to
1.9. Farmers were hardly involved in the technical design.
This new technical design required re-estimating the workload for the construction and linking
this to shares of water available at the intake. The earlier estimate of 80,000 shares was re-adjusted9
to 25,000. Based on the designed total discharge of 642 liters per second in the main canal, the
discharge per share was calculated: about 0.025 liters per second on continuous feed. To irrigate
one hectare, about 80 shares would be needed.
The project was planned in two phases. The budget for the construction and land distribution
in the first phase was NRs 15 million (US$600,000). NORAD (Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation), through UMN, gave this to AKWUA, partly as a grant of
NRs 5.4 million (US$216,000) and partly as a loan of NRs 6.1 million (US$244,000). In addition,
the beneficiaries contributed NRs 3.5 million (US$140,000) through labor. The grant for the second
phase was NRs 4.4 million (US$176,000). The loan was to be repaid, but repayments would be
kept as an emergency and repair fund by AKWUA.
In 1989, construction started near the village of Lalayangin. The whole scheme was finalized
in 1996. In 1997, the system was formally handed over to AKWUA. In the hand-over agreement,
AKWUA signed three contracts that arranged first, the repayment of the outstanding loan by
AKWUA, second, AKWUA’s commitment to completing the land reform, and, third, the further
sale of the water shares that UMN had earned itself. The outstanding loan amounted to
NRs 3.8 million, which meant that each farmer had a debt of NRs 100 per share. This was to be
paid back during five years with two seasons per year. Thus, the debt is NRs 10 per season per
share, to be deposited in the emergency and major repair fund of AKWUA. Since the handing
over of the system to the AKWUA, the role of UMN has been very limited.
Following up on the household survey, the land redistribution was implemented during the
construction and even the use phase. This process and its impacts on land-poor and landless farmers
are discussed in section four. The acquisition of water shares through participation in construction
work and the implications of allocation of “water to the people” during the use phase are discussed
in section five.
4.  Land Redistribution
4.1  Design of the Land Redistribution
At the start of the project, the UMN and village leaders agreed upon the principle that all
households in the project area that had more land than strictly needed for subsistence were obliged
to sell 10 percent of their “surplus” land to AKWUA as the intermediary land bank. The level for
subsistence was set at 11.5 annas (0.036 ha) irrigated land per person, which is considered to
equal 2 ropani (0.1 ha) rain-fed land, or 5 ropani (0.25 ha) fallow land (Poppe 1983). Thus, a
landless family of seven could apply for 0.25 hectare irrigated land. Landless and land-poor people
were given the opportunity to buy the “surplus” lands that AKWUA had bought from the larger
farmers. Claimants could buy land from AKWUA if they fulfilled the following criteria (Westborg
1989):
• Being a shareholder, having earned or bought water shares.
• Being a Nepali citizen and 16 years or older and living in the project area.
• Having less than 11.5 annas irrigated land per household member.
• Attaching the land certificate, if any, to the application.10
• Providing a recommendation letter from the ward chairman.
• Abiding by the rules and regulations of the Water Users Association.
First, the Evaluation Committee would select the beneficiaries and send their names with a
recommendation letter to the Land Distribution Committee. The Land Distribution Committee in
consultation with the Board of Directors of the Water Users Association would make the final
decision. Female-headed households were given priority. AKWUA’s constitution also stated that
land purchased by AKWUA should be allocated to beneficiaries within 6 months and that the
land redistribution should be implemented prior to commencement of the canal construction.
AKWUA also promised to sell land to landless farmers at the same price at which they purchased
it. To minimize land speculation, land acquired from AKWUA could, during the first 10 years
after acquisition, only be sold or mortgaged in any form to a third party after having obtained
approval of the Board of Directors.
The UMN had provided a loan to AKWUA to buy the land. AKWUA, in its turn, provided a
loan to the selected applicants to purchase the land. The new landowners had to repay the loan in
instalments that would be kept as an emergency and repair fund.
4.2  Implementation
The first step in the land redistribution process—the purchase of land from the “larger” farmers—was
implemented, but with a long delay. The “larger” landowners accepted to sell because, first, the
price for the lands sold was quite high and, second, the value of the remaining lands that would
be irrigated if UMN’s condition of land redistribution were accepted would increase. However,
the larger farmers tried to sell mainly scattered, low quality land. This meant un-terraced land or
land near forest, which was prone to attacks from monkeys. AKWUA asked neighboring farmers
who had to sell part of their land to select adjacent parts to sell, so that the plots to be bought by
AKWUA were at least 4 ropani in extent. In most cases, however, these farmers could not come
to an agreement as to which part should be sold. Other farmers, whose land was already fully or
partially irrigated by natural streams, objected to their land being included as “surplus” land.
Further, farmers disagreed with the classification of their land. The price of the land depended
upon the slope (NRs 2,000 for flat land, 1,800 for land with a slope up to 20% and 1,600 for a
slope up to 30%). Farmers, for example, in the units E6 and E7 refused to sell for this price,
arguing that their land had a higher value because it was flat and fertile. Nevertheless, eventually,
only three of the larger farmers did not sell the mandatory part of their “surplus” land. By 1999,
12 hectares (232 ropani) of land had been purchased by AKWUA.
The process of land allocation started in 1993, when eligible landless and marginal farmers
from the eight Village Development Committees (VDCs) of the project area applied for land. In
total 66 landless candidates and 71 marginal landowners applied, of these 120 were men and 17
women. The factual allocation of land started in 1995. By the end of 1999, a total of 12 hectares
land had been allocated to 53 (of the 137) farmers, which is an average of 0.23 hectares per family.
Of the 53 allocated land titles, 23 were in the name of landless farmers and 30 in the name of
marginal farmers. Initially no land was allocated to women, but after 1999, 18 women were
allocated land. In 10 cases, AKWUA considered the husbands who had applied for land not eligible
because of irresponsible behavior (drunkards), migration, or lack of investment power to use the
land productively. Therefore, AKWUA allocated to the women who were supposed to invest their11
own pewa (a woman’s own property, gifted from her parents, her husband, or her husband’s family).
Six households had women as their heads.
A problem in the land allocation phase arose when a shopkeeper, who was considered a rich
person, was allocated land. He did not possess land in the project area, which was the main criterion
for eligibility. However, he did have land in the Terai, the low plains in southern Nepal (NSAE,
1997:15). Although the constitution and by-laws made this allocation possible, it was not the
intention of UMN to allocate land to better-off people. Solving this issue not only blocked the
land allocation for about 2 years, but also discouraged farmers who were willing to sell.
The major problem was the huge delay in implementing land distribution in the Andhi Khola
area, in spite of the household survey of landholding sizes and family sizes of all families in the
project area being completed in 1984–1985. This considerably reduced the benefits for the poor.
In spite of the agreement at the start of the project, the purchase of land started only in 1989,
simultaneously with the start of construction, and went on till 1994. The allocation process was
also delayed. Thus the portion of land to be sold to AKWUA was based on the family size as
determined back in 1984. In some cases, family size changed between 1984 and 1989 due to
migration and other demographic reasons. Those farmers, who could have kept more land due to
an increase in family size, were reluctant to sell the whole portion of land based on the calculations
made in 1984. On the other hand, the delay proved advantageous for some of the original
landowners who had sold land to AKWUA but whose land was still in the name of the original
owner instead of AKWUA. The original owner could use this land sold to AKWUA, which was
not yet attributed to landless farmers. This person had to pay only a minimal rent (of NRs 2 per
season) to AKWUA.
Most importantly, the delay in the purchase of land affected the price of the land. During
1989–90, 3.5 hectares (70 ropani) of land was sold to AKWUA at slope-dependent rates of
NRs1,600–1,800–2,000 per ropani. However, in 1990/91 the purchase price of AKWUA was
increased to NRs 2,600–2,800–3,000. Since this price change did not have any retrospective effect,
this decision was strongly regretted by farmers who had already sold their land. When land was
finally sold to the eligible farmers, construction had almost been finished and the land was already
considered to be irrigated land. The Land Revenue office, therefore, objected to the sale of land
to the poor at the prices set by AKWUA. Even though AKWUA had promised the former
landowners that AKWUA would sell at the same price as when they bought the land, the selling
price of the land had to be raised substantially. This made the venture considerably less profitable
for the poor allottees and reinforced complaints among the earlier sellers.
The ultimate benefits for poor farmers were further curtailed in two other ways. First, at the
moment of land transfer, the land buyer had to pay a royalty of NRs1,500–3,000 to the Land
Revenue Office. Poor farmers were not able to pay this amount cash-down and had to take a loan.
This was only available from informal moneylenders. Second, the newly acquired land that was
still fallow and often un-terraced, needed high investments to make it cultivatable. Not all
beneficiary farmers could afford these extra investments. Especially the lower caste people, who
had had jobs outside agriculture before, lacked the farming experience. As a result, in some cases
the land was left fallow and there are no returns on the investments as yet. Hence, several farmers
could not repay the loan installments for their land. Up-to-date, no sanctions have been imposed
on these farmers.
A factor that undoubtedly contributed to the slow progress of implementation and relatively
high land prices, favoring the larger landowners, was the composition of the Evaluation Committee
and Land Distribution Committee of AKWUA, which implemented the land redistribution process.12
While landowners selling part of their “surplus” land were represented in these bodies, poor,
landless and marginal farmers were not. An implication of the delay was that during most of the
construction phase of the new scheme, landless and land-poor farmers lacked any guarantee that
they would obtain land in the new command area. This discouraged them to earn shares, as
elaborated in the next section.
4.3  Conclusions and Recommendations
The events in the Andhi Khola Irrigation Scheme confirm that land redistribution set by agencies
as a condition for irrigation investments and for which they provide a loan, is effective in enhancing
benefits for landless and land-poor people who, otherwise, would have been excluded from the
benefits of irrigation. However, the gains for poor farmers would have considerably improved if
this valid concept had been effectively implemented. To that end, agencies who seek to replicate
the distributive land reform should:
• Include the beneficiaries in the planning and implementation process of the land
distribution from the very inception onwards.
• Implement clear, valid, and credible criteria for those who are obliged to sell land and
those eligible to purchase land.
• Finalize the purchase of land from the larger landowners before construction starts and
sell land at the same low price it was purchased.
• Set a price for the land to be transferred that takes the quality of the land in consideration
(e.g., slope, former cultivation, adjoining plots, fertility, and terracing) so as to avoid low-
value land from being sold.
• Provide loans or subsidies to purchase land and to pay transaction costs.
• Include relevant institutions like the Land Revenue Office in the process from the very
beginning.
• Prioritize poor farmers who are motivated to undertake irrigated agriculture and who are
prepared to make the necessary initial labor investments.
• Ensure that people can use the resources they obtain by providing adequate extension
support and loans for land improvement and cultivation.
In order to enforce these conditions, funding agencies could, for example, release funds for
construction only after finalization of the agreed steps in land reform.
5.  Allocation of “Water to the People”
5.1  Design of the Allocation principle of “Water to the People”
When the construction of the Andhi Khola Irrigation Project started in 1989, the following water
allocation system had been designed and agreed upon by the UMN and the farmers:13
• Water shares can be earned either by supplying labor for the construction of the scheme
or by payment. This right is explicitly open to all household members in the project area,
regardless of sex or land title.
• A “ticket” is allocated to each household member in the project area. This entitles the
holder to acquire four water shares by contributing four times 5 days of labor in
construction of the scheme. In other words to hold four shares an individual has to put in
20 days of labor and this would entitle him/her to get sufficient water to irrigate one ropani
of land (0.05 ha).
• Farmer leaders can earn extra shares by supervising other farmers during construction:
supervising 100 farmers during one day is equivalent to 7 days labor.
• Each shareholder disposes of the proportion of water that his or her share permits.
• Shares can be traded, which means that those who are entitled to more water than they
actually use, can sell their surplus shares to those in need of extra water. So, farmers with
small landholdings and landless people can sell (part of) their shares to farmers with
relatively large landholdings. Selling and leasing out shares is expected to generate a stable
source of income for landless and land poor farmers (Westborg 1989).
• Every season (twice a year) farmers have to register with AKWUA as to how many shares
they want to use in the coming season.
• Water distribution in the main canal and distributaries is fully regulated according to the
number of shares registered for that part of the command area. (The physical infrastructure
of the irrigation scheme incorporates sophisticated division boxes that allow the required
diversion of water in different directions and in different [even very small] quantities).
• The water service fee is based on the number of registered shares. This fee has to be paid
at the end of the cultivation season for which the shares were acquired. It is only after
this payment is made that shares can be registered for the next season.
• Farmers are obliged to contribute labor for canal maintenance. Depending upon the Branch
canal, labor obligations are either proportional to number of shares registered, or the same
for each household. In case of non-participation, a fine must be paid.
5.2  Acquisition of Shares during Construction
The first part of the implementation of this water share system was the acquisition of shares during
the construction phase. Implementation started in 1984 with the allocation of one ticket to each
household member in the project area, which entitled them to earn water shares for 1 ropani (0.05
ha) of irrigated land. However, the total number of tickets that were distributed was based on the
originally projected infrastructure covering about 600 hectares. Later, this was reduced to 282
hectares, which required a lower labor input. The reduction of future benefits disappointed the
people, while the cancellation of a part of the already distributed tickets caused confusion.
Another problem was that the participation of landless people was much below expectation.
Only 450 of the 17,739 farmer-earned shares were gained by poor people who were not irrigating14
yet, while the whole objective was that this group should gain 50 percent of the shares. Apparently,
the “Motivational Campaign” had failed to convince them. With the delay in the implementation
of the land reform, they were not convinced that they would ever be in the position to buy land,
nor were they convinced of the (future) use of the shares. Most landless people who ultimately
gained access to land bought shares after the construction phase.
Although there was not always work available at times convenient for people, and there were
not always people available at times the project needed them, farmer participation in construction
work was generally adequate till 1994. After 1994 mostly hired laborers undertook the construction
work. This was partly because farmers had already earned enough shares to cover their water
needs and partly because more complicated structures like the siphon bridge to Asardi were built.
Moreover, the UMN was pressurized by the government to speed up the implementation and also
to pay for the labor, rather than demanding it for free. Hence, the UMN used hired labor for the
last 2 years of construction. By doing so, the UMN itself earned over 7,000 water shares. The
UMN handed out some of these shares to the physically weak and poor people. AKWUA also
sold its shares. Those who bought the shares were mainly larger farmers who wanted more shares
than they could earn during the construction phase (each household member was allocated only
one ticket and thus four water shares). This way, those larger farmers no longer had to depend on
poor farmers and the landless to buy shares. The expected scarcity in shares among better-off
households that would lead to their demand for water from the poorer households and the
emergence of a water market remained unrealized.
5.3  “Equality” in Acquisition and Registration of Water Shares
Once the scheme started functioning farmers had to register the number of water shares they
intended to use for the coming season with AKWUA. The number of registered shares determined
the amount of water services fees to be paid. In the cultivation season of 1996/1997, the water
service fee was NRs 17 per share.2 Thus, per hectare of irrigated land (which equals 20 ropani
and requires 80 shares), a farmer had to pay NRs 1,360 per season. For comparison, in a run-of-
the river system rates of NRs 60 per season per hectare are normal; for pump systems this is
NRs 400 (IWMI 1999). The high service fee is partly due to the large debt component, but even
disregarding the debt component the water service fee is still NRs 560 per hectare per season.
This is extremely high for a gravity irrigation system in Nepal.
In the 53 sample households of different socioeconomic groups, the number of shares acquired
during the construction phase and the number of shares registered in 1999 were assessed. In Table
1 the average number of shares acquired and registered by a socioeconomic group is compared
with the number of shares required based on the size of the irrigated land, assuming that shares/
water requirements are proportional to land size.
Table 1 shows that especially the poorest households have earned more shares than required
according to their land size. They earned in average 24 shares per household, while they needed
only 14 for their limited land sizes. Moreover, the rule that a farmer should register water
requirements proportional to land size (so four shares per ropani), is not consistently implemented.
Especially the “poorest” households tended to acquire more shares than required. “Poor”
2 The fee per share is made up of the following components: administration costs, NRs 2.; headwork maintenance
cost, NRs 2, to be remitted to Butwal Power Company Limited; operation and maintenance cost of AKWUA, NRs 3;
loan repayment, NRs 10, as indicated in section 3.15
households on an average acquired and registered number of shares that is in accordance with
their land size. There are also cases, for example, of a poor household with 0.23 hectare of irrigated
land (4.5 ropani) that had registered and paid for all of their 32 water shares in 1998, whereas it
would have been enough for them to register (4.5 times 4) 18 shares only. It is likely that the
poorer households are not well informed and not fully aware of how the share system works.
However, it could also be a deliberate attempt on their part to secure their access to water.
Above all, the allocation of “equal water rights” benefited the “middle” and especially the
“better-off” who obtained considerably less shares through labor or purchase, than they would
actually need to irrigate their larger plots. Moreover, both the “better-off” and the “middle” group
farmers registered considerably less water shares than required for the size of their land, and
therefore, also paid considerably less. The differences between the poor and non-poor lie in their
ability to exploit rules stipulating equality. This sometimes leads to situations where poor farmers
cultivate 2 ropani land with 20 water shares registered, while others, especially the better-off,
cultivate 25 ropani land with the same number of water shares.
While, ironically, there is “equality” in fulfilling obligations, the key question remaining is
whether poorer farmers who are theoretically entitled to relatively more water receive these
quantities in reality and whether they can valorize their water rights in other ways.
5.4  “Inequity” in Factual Water Allocation and Distribution
The field study found that the theoretical rights based on the registered shares failed to play any
role in factual water distribution and allocation. For example, field staff could not indicate how
many shares corresponded to a certain quantity of water in a distributary canal. Farmers along
the same tertiary canal did not even know the number of shares registered by their peers with
whom they compete for water. Several poor farmers complained explicitly that they received less
water than what they were entitled to according to their shares. Twenty of the eighty-three farmers
in the sample survey were reported to suffer from water theft. Most of them were from the poor
and poorest socioeconomic group. Reportedly, powerful farmers were still able to take water
according to their requirements. Or as one poor farmer expressed: “They can afford it to change
the hot water on the field for fresh cold water from the canal.”  A woman from the low Damai
caste lost her water turn during the paddy transplanting time to a Brahmin male farmer. He
recognized it was her turn, but he told her that she could wait, because the problems in his big
field were much more important than her concerns for her small field. She had to cancel the
laborers who were to help her, but still had to pay for their cost. This woman had over-registered:
Table 1. Required, acquired, and registered shares by socioeconomic group (averages per
household).
Socioeconomic Average land Required shares Acquired  shares Registered
Group size per based on land during shares in
household (ha)  size* construction  1999
Better-off 1.0 82 31 33**
n=4
Middle 0.59 47 21 19
n=19
Poor 0.25 20 23 22
n=7
Poorest 0.17 14 24 16
n=23
Note: *0.05 hectare land = 1 ropani = 4 shares
          **The number of registered shares can be higher than the number of shares acquired during construction because farmers
  can buy shares.16
she had registered 28 shares, while 16 shares would have been enough for her 4 ropani. Although
in her distributory, E6, rules had been set that those who take someone else’s water turn have to
pay fines to the Branch Canal Committee, this rule was never applied. According to other
respondents, the Branch Canal Committee is not in a position to control the better-off farmers
because the Branch Canal Committee itself is controlled by larger farmers.
This was a general observation: poorer farmers were underrepresented in the AKWUA
organization. As table 2 shows, middle and better-off male respondents participated more regularly
in formal meetings of AKWUA than poorer men. None of the people from the poorest strata of
society is represented in a Committee.
Table 2: Current participation of the sample male farmers in formal meetings.
N= 35 Never Sometimes Always
Poor and poorest men 6 8 6
Middle and better off men 0 0 15
TOTAL men 6 8 21
Hence, even factual water allocation was biased against the poorer farmers, in spite of their
relatively stronger abstract rights. The implementation of the allocation principle of “water to
people” also resulted in the common inequities observed elsewhere in access to water to the
detriment of poorer farmers.
The separation of water rights from land rights could have improved the bargaining power of
tenants or women, who without landownership titles could have gained from their own independent
water rights. However, neither tenants nor women were actually found to benefit from the
implementation of the allocation principle of “water to the people.”  Landowners remained
independent from tenants’ water rights because they already had their own shares or were able to
access water, as they wanted, without holding shares or paying proportional fees. Moreover, cash
and labor contributions that tenants had to make continued being registered in the name of the
landowner, as before. Only where long-term contracts such as pawning (mortgage) was concerned,
the contributions of the cultivators were registered in the tenants’ own names, but this had been
the practice even before the commencement of the project. Thus, the project failed to bring about
any significant change for tenants.
Similarly, the new allocation principle failed to favor women. Although some women irrigated
alone or jointly with their husbands, water shares were commonly registered in their husbands’
names. Husbands also arranged transactions like the renting out or selling of water shares. Women
were often uninformed about the number of shares and transactions made. While in one- third of
the sample households women participated in maintenance activities, their contributions were
typically registered in their husbands’ names. Thus, the early suggestion by the UMN to register
women’s labor contributions in their own names had not been implemented (Westborg 1989:14).
In AKWUA’s constitution, daughters’ inheritance of water rights were recognized, provided they
married in the Andhi Khola command area; sons would inherit anyhow. However, in reality,
inheritance was still primarily governed by the prevailing inheritance laws, which categorically
forbade daughters to inherit water shares. This is illustrated by the case of a daughter who settled
in the command area after marriage. She had claimed her shares several times from her family,
but her father still “has to discuss with her brothers to decide if she also should get shares.” In17
two similar cases, two (landless) daughters were waiting in vain for their family to hand over
their shares so they could apply for land from AKWUA.
Women’s exclusion from resource rights was perpetuated by their exclusion from decision-
making bodies of AKWUA, especially since the departure of the UMN. A study of 11 Branch
Canal Committees showed that there were only two women representatives in all the 11 branches.
Among 48 women interviewed, only one woman attended meetings, that too only sometimes.
Among the men, three-quarters attended meetings either always or sometimes. Women complained
that they were not informed about decisions taken at the meetings regarding water distribution,
but that they were only informed about canal maintenance. In short, as most land titles were also
registered in men’s names, water shares ended up being vested in the same person as the land
rights. The UMN’s lofty goal of separating land and water rights for the benefit of cultivators
without landownership remained unfulfilled in reality.
5.5  Conclusions and Recommendations
In the Andhi Khola Irrigation Scheme, allocation of equal water rights to all, irrespective of land
size and landownership status, effectively led to the envisaged situation in which marginal
landowners acquired many more shares per unit of land than the larger landowners. The “middle”
and especially the “better-off” farmers acquired and registered considerably less number of shares
than required. This, however, did not deter them from irrigating most or all of their fields, even if
they directly deprived smaller farmers of water during times of scarcity. Shares, even the relatively
high numbers of shares registered and paid for by marginal farmers, did not give the least protection
against inequities in water distribution. The better-off dominated in the Water Users Association
Committees. Poor people are dependent upon these households for their livelihoods. This makes
it difficult to enforce regulations or correct the behavior of the offenders. Since no sanctions were
imposed, there was even less stimulus for the offenders to allow the poor to take water, let alone
to lease it out or buy shares from the poorer groups
Thus, the water market that was planned to emerge as a result of the share system did not
materialize. As a result, the poor could not capitalize on the surplus water shares they had earned
with their disproportionate labor and cash contributions. The larger farmers now benefit from the
larger quantities of water that they use for their land at almost similar investment costs as the
smallholders, who use far less water. Hence, the concept of “water allocation to the people” itself
appeared invalid: there was too much focus on equality in obligations, without adequate emphasis
on equality in rights.
Projects that still wish to consider allocation of equal water rights for more equity can avoid
the pitfalls encountered by the Andhi Khola Irrigation Project, if they:
• Ensure that rights become more equal, while obligations remain at least proportional to
real benefits, if not relatively less.
• Secure poor male and female farmers’ effective participation in decision-making over water
rights and obligations. This not only concerns participation in formal and informal
meetings, but also participation in the various Committees. By doing so, poor farmers
can better represent their interests in setting rules and enforcing rule compliance.18
• Ensure that a water market emerges in which the poor find clients to whom they can sell
their water rights and moreover in which the position of the poorest is strong enough to
enforce compensation of sold water rights.
• Inform smallholders about their rights and obligations and prevent them from registering
more shares than required for the portion of land that they intend to irrigate.
• Encourage the registration of women’s and tenants’ labor contributions in their own names.
Not only was the allocation principle of “water to the people” inappropriate—because it
focused too much on obligations neglecting rights—but its implementation was also accompanied
by problems. Projects that consider the creation of resource rights through investments in
construction should:
• Develop a clear technical design, including size of the command area, available water
sources, and total labor requirements. Procedures for implementation should be consistent
throughout the construction period. If that is not feasible, for example because of external
pressure by the government, it is better for projects to employ poor women and men in
construction work and pay wages.
• Inform all stakeholders about the realistic benefits of the project. On such a basis, everyone
can make an informed judgment as to whether or not it is worth participating in the project.
If considerable changes in the projections have to be made, this should also be well
communicated.
• If applicable, finalize land redistribution in the command area before construction and
before the earning of water shares is launched. In this way, new entrants in the command
area will be secure of their land rights and, hence, more motivated to contribute to the
construction work.
6.  Conclusions: Do Equal Land and Water Rights Benefit the Poor?
The distribution of benefits from irrigation development is more or less proportional to land
distribution, which is often highly unequal. Under such conditions irrigation development is a
blunt tool to alleviate poverty. Even an agency as strongly committed to changing this situation
as the UMN, was only partially successful in better targeting the benefits of irrigation investments
to the poor. More equality in land rights, as the UMN successfully proposed initially, appeared a
valid concept for poverty alleviation. However, the delay in implementation of the concept diluted
the positive impacts for the poor. The most opportune moment for the land transfer, well before
construction, was lost. This rendered the land price for the poor high and it benefited larger farmers
willing to sell. Inequalities remained substantive. Moreover, the support for small farmers to make
productive use of the newly acquired resources was also inadequate.
While the concept of more equal land rights was valid, the assumption that equal water rights
(with equal obligations) would benefit the poor proved to be an invalid concept. Water only
generates benefits if it is input in a self-managed enterprise or if water can effectively be exchanged
with others who need water and are willing to compensate. The assumed possibilities for the poor19
to sell water to the non-poor within a gravity irrigation scheme—even though fine-tuned water
distribution is physically possible—appeared unrealistic. Thus, poor smallholders’ only gains from
water were with respect to their own irrigated plots. As their plots are small, their water needs
are also small, and so would their obligations be if they were proportional to the quantity of water
used. However, the principle of “water to the people” led to poor people’s rather equal contributions
to fulfill obligations. Fulfilling disproportionate obligations was no help at all in negotiations over
water. The more powerful farmers continued contesting even the small amounts of water that small
farmers needed on their small plots. In Andhi Khola, the only equality achieved as a result of the
allocation principle of “water to the people,” was that non-poor farmers’ got away with fulfilling
equal obligations for much higher quantities of water. The concept that equal water rights-cum-
obligations benefit the poor is debatable indeed.
Perhaps the most important lesson learnt from the experiences in Andhi Khola is that the core
of any concept of pro-poor intervention should have agencies that directly communicate with the
poor themselves, inform them, consult them, and empower them vis-à-vis the non-poor, throughout
the project cycle. If poor farmers and landless people, men and women, had effectively been
included and listened to by the AKWUA from the planning phase, their contribution to the
conceptual design of equal land and water rights would most certainly have led to sounder and
more realistic concepts. Moreover, their active and well-informed participation in the
implementation would have enabled the AKWUA to pursue and enforce implementation of the
land reform as conceived, and strengthen its poorest members’ bargaining position to effectuate
access to water at reasonable, proportional costs.2021
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